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Walker v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 80 (Dec. 10, 2020)1 
WRITS OF MANDAMUS: NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR APPEAL 
 
Summary  
 The Court considered whether to grant petitioners’ request for a writ of mandamus to 
compel the district court to strike opposing counsel’s petition for a trial de novo in an arbitration 
dispute. The Court held that petitioners had not met the requirements for a writ of mandamus 
petition and therefore denied petitioners’ request. 
 
Background  
Two distinct personal injury disputes joined cause in this petition. The first stems from 
injuries Walker sustained when Michaels collided with Walker with her vehicle while Walker 
rode his bike in the bike lane. The second matter stems from the damages suffered by Ortega 
after Fritter rear-ended his vehicle at an intersection. Both cases proceeded to Nevada’s court-
annexed arbitration program. Pursuant to the Nevada Arbitration Rules, Michaels and Fritter 
each served offers of judgement in their individual cases. Both Walker and Ortega rejected these 
offers. Eventually, the arbitrator in both Walker’s and Ortega’s cases found in their favor. The 
damages awarded substantially exceeded the amount that Michaels and Fritter had each 
previously offered.  
Michaels and Fritter, represented by the same attorney, McMillen, sought trials de novo. 
Walker and Ortega alleged that McMillen had arbitrated in bad faith by using de novo requests to 
obstruct and delay the process. Walker and Ortega relied on statistical information purporting to 
demonstrate the undue frequency of McMillen’s requests for trials de novo. Walker and Ortega 
filed nearly identical motions to strike McMillen’s requests for trials de novo based on Nevada 
Arbitration Rule 22.  
The district court consolidated the separate motions to strike and then rejected both, 
holding that the statistical evidence Walker and Ortega had presented was not sufficient to 
establish that McMillen had arbitrated in bad faith. Walker and Ortega then filed a writ of 
mandamus petition to the Nevada Supreme Court demanding that the Court reverse the district 
court’s finding, and that it compels the district court to strike Michael’s and Fritter’s request for 
trials de novo.  
 
Discussion  
The Nevada Constitution grants the Nevada Supreme Court with the authority to issue 
writs of mandamus. The traditional writ of mandamus is a remedy distinguishable from others in 
that it recognizes a legal duty and compels its performance where there is no other remedy at 
law. Under the Court’s constitutional authority, as directed and refined by statute and its 
corresponding common law, the chief requisites for a writ of mandamus petition are: (1) the 
petitioner must show a legal right to compel the act sought by the writ; (2) the act must be the 
plain legal duty of the respondent to perform, without the respondent having the discretion to 
choose whether or not to do the act; and (3) the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, or adequate 
 
1  By Luis Montanez. 
remedy. Where the Court is asked to use its powers of mandamus on a lower court, significant 
overlap exists between the first and second requirements.2 
 If a district court is entrusted with discretion on an issue, then the Nevada Supreme Court 
can issue a traditional mandamus only where the lower court has manifestly abused that 
discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Traditional mandamus relief cannot be given 
where a discretionary lower court decision results from a mere error in judgement; instead, 
mandamus relief is available only where the law is overridden or misapplied, or when the 
judgement exercised is manifestly unreasonable, prejudicial, biased, or done in ill will. The 
Nevada Supreme Court cannot substitute its judgement for the judgement of the district court. 
Furthermore, the Court wishes not to subvert the district court’s right to decide according to its 
own view of the facts and law; nor does it want to ignore the fact that an adequate remedy will 
almost always exist, such as an appeal or writ of error. Because mandamus is an extraordinary 
remedy, the Nevada Supreme Court does not typically employ it where ordinary methods 
permitted by law already exist to correct any alleged errors. The right to appeal is generally an 
adequate legal remedy that precludes mandamus relief.  
 In the present case, the Court concluded that petitioners had failed to demonstrate any of 
the prerequisites for a traditional writ of mandamus. For the first requirement, petitioners relied 
on Gittings v. Hartz to argue that the frequency of McMillen’s requests for trials de novo plainly 
established his bad faith participation in arbitration as a matter of law. But in Gittings, the Court 
actually rejected on the facts the argument that petitioners raised. Additionally, Gittings did not 
obligate a district court to credit statistical evidence it determined was incomplete and 
insufficient to establish bad faith. As to the second consideration, the petitioners failed to analyze 
their argument under the proper standard when claiming that the district court had abused its 
discretion. The Court explained that the question of counsel’s bad faith is one of fact, and 
therefore must be left to the district court’s discretion. As mentioned earlier, the Court’s 
mandamus relief is not available to correct a mere abuse of discretion. The record does not 
support the idea that the district court’s actions amounted to the sort of overtly erroneous conduct 
that would make the extraordinary relief of mandamus available. This is especially true because 
Gittings, the case upon which petitioners relied heavily, does not clearly require the relief sought 
by petitioners. Petitioners have neither identified their legal right to have the requests for trials de 
novo stricken, nor demonstrated that it was the district court’s plain legal duty to strike the 
respondent’s petitions. Instead, the petitioners want to convert the writ of mandamus into a writ 
of error, by having the Nevada Supreme Court review a discretionary order and adjudge it to be 
erroneous.  
 Furthermore, the petition likewise fails under the third requirement because there is an 
obviously adequate remedy at law—namely, that petitioners may appeal when their cases 
resolve. As prior precedent teaches, a remedy does not fail to be speedy and adequate merely 
because it would take a longer period of time to resolve than a mandamus proceeding.3 The 
Nevada Supreme Court is only concerned with the existence of a remedy.4 
 
2  See Thomas Carl Spelling, A Treatise on Injunctions and Other Extraordinary Remedies 1230 (2d ed. 1901) (“In 
order to entitle a party to mandamus to compel action by the judge of an inferior court … it is incumbent upon him 
to show that it is clearly the duty of such judge to do the act sought to be coerced”).  
3  Washoe County v. City of Reno, 77 Nev. 152, 156, 360 P. 2d 602, 603 (1961) (citing Steves v. Robic, 31 A. 2d 
797 (Me. 1943)).  
4  Id. at 156, 360 P. 2d at 604.  
 In some cases, the Nevada Supreme Court has granted mandamus relief, the so-called 
“advisory” mandamus, where a petitioner presented legal issues of statewide importance 
requiring clarification, and their decision would promote judicial economy and administration by 
assisting other jurists, parties, and lawyers.5 Given that this is an expansion of the common law 
doctrine and statutory procedural authorization, the Court takes seriously the judicial limitations 
placed upon the “advisory” mandamus. The Court explained that in this case the petitioners do 
not qualify for advisory mandamus for three reasons: (1) the dispute in district court was factual, 
not legal, and sufficient evidence supports the district court’s factual finding of no bad faith; (2) 
the disagreement does not present a serious issue of substantial public policy or involve 
important precedential questions of statewide interests; and (3) a review of the factual question in 
this case would not promote judicial economy.  
 
Conclusion 
Because petitioners did not meet the requirements for a writ of mandamus, nor did they 
offer any cogent, compelling reason for the Court to issue an “advisory” mandamus, the Court 
denied their petition for a writ of mandamus and lifted the stays imposed on the underlying 


























5  MDC Rests., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 315, 319, 419 P.3d 148, 152 (2018); see also Archon 
Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. 816, 820, 407 P.3d 702, 706 (2017).  
 
